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Abstract 
 
 
The world recessionary period of the 1980's forced many governments to re-evaluate their 
economic management strategies.  Today, existing strategies are being supplanted by a belief 
that economic growth is best achieved by less government intervention in the economy.  This 
paper examines public sector reforms in Indonesia, Malaysia and New Zealand, three Asia-
Pacific trading partners.  While descriptive in nature, the researchers believe that the 
contribution of this research is its socio-cultural and historical accounts of these changes, as 
well as its Asia/Pacific focus. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Since the early to mid 1980’s, governments in many countries have done an about-turn in their 
thinking regarding the role of the government in the economy.  In the past the guiding 
economic conviction in many nations was Keynesian in nature, based on notions of government 
control and intervention.  This extended to government ownership and operation of strategic 
assets such as telecommunications, power generation, rail and air transport, and supply of 
water.  Today, however, it is common to find governments trying to disengage from what is 
now regarded, by many, as a paternalistic role.  To varying degrees, we are now seeing 
significant public sector restructuring involving decreased public ownership, and structural and 
procedural transformations through privatisation, corporatisation, downsizing and 
debureaucratisation.  The prevailing economic wisdom is now more neo-classical in nature, 
with the role of the government minimised and the “invisible hand of the market” now 
expected, to a much greater extent, to guide economies in a more efficient and effective 
manner. 
 
Most studies of public sector reform have focused on this - how to achieve efficiencies at the 
firm or general economy level.  More recently, there has also been attention to the impact of 
public sector reform on groups other than shareholders (De Castro, Meyer, Strong and 
Uhlenbruck, 1996).  This work, nevertheless, has predominantly been in-country and has given 
little consideration to socio-cultural factors that may have influenced these changes or this 
impact on management.  This study will address these issues in relation to Indonesia, Malaysia 
and New Zealand.  The former two nations were selected because both exports and imports to 
and from them and New Zealand have increased, because it is believed that cultural differences 
may influence the nature of reform practices, and because, while New Zealand conducted most 
of its reforms in the 1980s, the other two countries are only now facing the need for urgent 
restructuring.  It is that hoped that this discussion will encourage others to question whether 
reform practices are internationally transferable, and to examine the interface between national 
reform agendas and what needs to occur at an organisation level. 
  
 
2
 
0
100
200
300
400
500
1991 1995 1996
N
Z$
(m
ill
) Indonesia(E)
Malaysia(E)
Indonesia(I)
Malaysia(I)
 
 
Figure 1 
New Zealand Trade with Indonesia and Malaysia 
(Source: Statistics NZ 1997) 
 
In the following sections a background to government reforms and the meaning of associated 
terms is provided.  A taxonomy of national economic policy strategies is then presented and 
discussed, followed by a brief historical account of reforms in Indonesia, Malaysia and New 
Zealand.  The espoused rationales behind these developments are then considered, before an 
overview of the similarities and differences between reform practices in the three nations is 
outlined.  The paper concludes by examining the managerial implications of government 
reforms, suggesting that these need to support higher level government strategies, as well as the 
gap that may exist between current management skills, knowledge and culture and those which 
are required to achieve national objectives. 
 
 
2.  Background 
 
Public sector reform adopts many guises, and the degree and pace of these reforms differ 
substantially.  Most government reforms, however, have some mix of corporatisation, 
deregulation, privatisation, restructuring and debureaucratisation.  The use of terminology 
relating to government reform practices, however, is diverse and fragmented.  For example, 
changes can be considered from an individual organisational viewpoint, or from an industry or 
national perspective.  For this reason it is often difficult to make direct comparisons between 
studies and to articulate clearly what reforms have actually been adopted, especially when 
comparing across national boundaries.  Haley and Tan (1996) have also noted that research  
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into what has happened in many developing nations in South-East Asia is often beset by an 
informational black-hole which places constraints on analysis. 
 
Perry and Rainey (1988) have suggested that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) can be classified 
on a public-private continuum.  Politically controlled and funded organisations (government 
agencies) lie at one end, while at the other are market-controlled government corporations 
financed by capital markets.  Reform of the public sector can also be thought of in relation to 
the degree of change that occurs.  This can be considered on the basis of shareholder changes, 
changes to employment relationship processes, and decreases in staffing and administration. 
 
For the purposes of this paper, privatisation refers to those goods and services, previously 
financed and provided by government, that have become financed, fully or partially, by the 
private sector.  Corporatisation refers to cases where government retains ownership of an 
organisation but adopts a private sector business philosophy, such as managerial accountability 
and management contracts.  Deregulation involves the reduction or elimination of government 
rules that regulate an industry or economic activity, for example, tariffs. 
 
Reform is not an easy task for any government, either politically or practically.  Vested 
interests that prospered under old frameworks are not likely to welcome such changes - for new 
orthodoxies are typically quite different to what constituents have grown to expect.   Other 
factors are also prompting governments to undertake public sector restructuring, for example, 
costly and cumbersome organisations which are unresponsive to local needs.  As a recent 
OECD report stated, some countries have spent up to 63 percent of GDP in their public sector 
alone (OECD, 1996b).  MacIntyre and Jayasuriya (1995) made a similar observation.  1  The 
world recessionary period of the 1980's provided this impetus for change in many countries, 
while others are only now addressing this issue following the Asian financial crisis.  Thus, 
around the world in the past decade, in widely differing geographic areas and societies, 
governments have been forced to re-examine the way they have managed their economies.  
Exactly how governments have responded to the challenges in their environment is discussed in 
the next section.  
 
 
1 It is interesting to note that the Economist in its recent "Survey of the World Economy" (1997:ff70), maintains 
that, notwithstanding the large amount of restructuring that has taken place in the OECD, government spending as 
a percentage of GDP has actually increased in most member countries. 
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3.  Governance Strategies 
 
After the industrial revolution in Britain and America businesses and governments worked 
closely together to encourage economic growth.  Cronyism and dubious deals between the two, 
however, became rife and were only overthrown after the 1929 economic crash (Saludo, 1998). 
 Both governments then set about ensuring transparency and fairness in their economic and 
commercial management practices, as well as building a legislative framework to support these 
initiatives.  Two further events, The Great Depression and World War II, then shook both 
nations.  Their response was to increase the role of the state in the economy to provide social 
and economic aid to their citizens, as well as to increase national development plans.  This 
situation continued up until the 1980s, reaching a stage where some governments were 
spending a very large proportion of their GDP in this area.  Further events and environmental 
changes in the 1980s, including oil price shocks and increasing globalisation of economies, 
forced another rethink of government actions (World Development Report, 1997).  In response, 
countries like New Zealand and Britain took steps to decrease government involvement in their 
economies, placing greater emphasis on accountability and competitiveness in local markets. 
 
Governments in nations such as Malaysia and Indonesia have been facing similar challenges.  
Their environments and histories, nevertheless, are quite different.  Years of colonial rule only  
came to an end in the late 1940s to mid 1950s and both countries, while finally independent,  
were left with little of the necessary infrastructure, capital or industries that were required for 
healthy economic growth.  With memories of imperialism still clear in their minds, they turned 
to business associates and other connections to provide resources to kickstart their economies, 
in much the same way as Britain and America did after the industrial revolution (Saludo, 1998). 
 Huge infrastructure projects and industry development initiatives were undertaken.  The close 
links fostered between government and other sections in these societies brought considerable 
benefits to both, at a time when industrial nations were faring less well.  Many world 
economists hailed this situation as a new Asian economic model, one containing the values of 
deference to authority and collective enterprise that are common in such collectivist cultures.  
Over time, however, there was mounting concern about the practices of the Indonesian and 
Malaysian governments, with allegations of mismanagement, corruption and cronyism 
increasingly heard.  Both governments had taken measures to become more internationally 
competitive and to industrialise their economies in the 1980s with some  
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considerable success, still major problems resulting from their strategic and management 
policies were not given serious consideration until 1997, following the crisis in Asian 
currencies and stockmarkets (Chandler, 1997). 
 
The economic management practices of industrialised nations were conceptualised in 1968 by 
Dahrendorf, as either Market or Plan Rational.  Market Rational economies were identified as 
European-type economies that had a smooth-functioning market, that allocated benefits to the 
greatest number of people, rather than the government.  Plan Rational governments were 
considered to be those where the state regulated, directed and encouraged companies to act to 
help achieve national goals.  These included centrally-planned Socialist countries like Russia. 
Henderson (1994) extended Dahrendorf’s conceptualisation of governance philosophies 
advocating two additional rationales, Market Ideological and Planned Ideological, as well as 
redefining the original categories. 
 
 
Market Plan
Ideology Ideology
Market Plan
Rational Rational
New
Zealand *
UK
Netherlands Malaysia
Indonesia*
Singapore
Taiwan Japan
US
RussiaChina
 
 
 
Figure 2 
Conceptual Framework of National Economic Policies 
(Source: adapted from Henderson,1994. ** These countries added by authors) 
 
Dahrendorf’s original Plan Rational category, containing countries such as the old USSR, was 
redefined as Plan Ideological while a new category, Market Ideological, was added. Henderson 
(1994) justified this extension and modification to the model because of the changing economic 
circumstances of many nations.  The New Right governments that had emerged in the OECD 
were characterised as Market Ideological because of their return to competitive capitalism and 
their increasingly hands-off approach to the market.  The economic  
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and political changes in Socialist nations saw them moving from Plan Ideological and shifting 
toward a Market Rational approach.  This latter category included nations like the Netherlands, 
whose government "legislates the parameters in which private companies operate. (but). 
investment, production and distributional decisions are the preserve of private companies and 
their actions, if disciplined at all, are disciplined by the market," (Henderson, 1994, 87).  States 
in the Plan Rational category were considered to be those that undertook government-led 
transformations but pursued capitalist, rather than Socialist, philosophies. Many Asian nations 
were identified in this category. 
 
New Zealand was not considered in Henderson's economic framework, nevertheless, it appears 
to have moved from a Market Rational style of governance prior to 1984, to a Market 
Ideological stance.  The views of architects of the reforms of this time such as Roger Douglas, a 
former Minister of Finance,2 conform well to these descriptions.  Malaysia, according to 
Henderson, had shifted from Market to Plan Rational.  We have also placed Indonesia in this 
position.  This decision is supported by the fact that Indonesia and Malaysia have well-defined 
and publicised long-term plans and, furthermore, that the Malaysian government, and until very 
recently Indonesia, appear to have no intention of relinquishing overall stewardship of their 
economies unlike New Zealand. 
 
It was Henderson's (1994) belief that the best performing economies, Asian Tigers, could be 
characterised as Plan Rational.  The USA and UK economies were considered among the worst 
performing Western economies at the time and Henderson had little faith in Market Ideological 
societies.  Much has happened in Asia since the end of 1997, however, and little of it positive.  
One could argue that despite Henderson’s beliefs, a Plan Rational philosophy was not the 
problem, rather it was how economic strategies were implemented or because of outside 
interference.  In the former explanation, too much inappropriate or corrupt private speculation 
and debt, as well as a lack of accountability could be to blame.  On the other hand, as Dr 
Mahathir has frequently argued, foreign speculators could have initiated the Malaysian crisis.  
Whatever the cause, Asian states hit by the recent crisis have shown few signs of recovery.  
This has forced nations, such as Indonesia, Thailand and Korea, to agree to IMF demands for 
strict restructuring programmes in order to gain access to monetary bailouts, although in some 
cases the IMF appears to have softened their demands.  These restructuring  
 
2  Sir Roger Douglas sets out his views in two books - see Douglas, 1980 and 1993.  The ideological stance and 
approach of the last four governments of New Zealand are well described by Jane Kelsey (Kelsey, 1995). 
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programmes, required by the IMF, follow a typical New Right formula.  They would see these 
Asian economies moving more toward a Market Ideological stance.  Malaysia is in a slightly 
better position, having tackled the flight of capital and currency depreciation itself but it is by 
no means out of the woods (Hiebert, 1998).  They may yet need to rethink their economic 
strategies and how these are implemented. 
 
Two important issues need to be raised here. The first relates to the model itself and then there 
is the question of economic governance styles.  Henderson's model does provide a useful 
snapshot of global economic policies and room to illustrate movement.  The manner in which it 
classifies countries, however, is very open to interpretation.  Further, and perhaps more 
importantly, Henderson asserts a Plan Rational style of governance is most successful and 
Market Ideological least so.  Recent economic events challenge Henderson’s assertion about 
the superiority of a Plan Rational approach, although, it could be argued that the worst hit Asian 
countries’ problems are not so much the result of government philosophies and strategies but 
rather their appropriation, to varying degrees, by private individuals and families and their 
corrupt use of power.  The implications of this are that “standard” economic philosophies and 
policies may be agreed on but are subject to the integrity of officials, and adapted to the needs 
and characteristics of different cultures, including practices such as nepotism, as well as macro-
environmental trends.  It is therefore possible to speculate that the problems that recently 
emerged in Asia were not “caused” by a Plan Rational philosophy, but rather how this was 
adapted to local customs, abusive practices, and, of course, global economic events.  What is 
further open to question is whether the IMF should impose an economic governance model 
which may work in, say, the USA, onto an entirely different culture without appropriate 
adaptation.  If governance models were allocated by compatibility with local culture and history 
rather than economic “one best way” thinking, then Plan Rational models would appear to be 
more suitable for collectivist societies like Malaysia and Indonesia.  Recent negotiations 
between Indonesia and the IMF indicate they may be prepared to accommodate some degree of 
local considerations. 
 
In the next sections a more detailed background to public sector reform practices in Indonesia, 
Malaysia and New Zealand are given.  The socio-cultural, political, and historical differences 
and similarities between these three trading partners are then highlighted, along with their 
economic philosophies. 
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4.  Indonesia 
 
In 1949 Indonesia gained independence from the Dutch, after nearly five centuries of 
colonisation.  Initially, the country adopted a parliamentary system of democracy, ruling with a 
coalition of parties.  With some 24 parties competing for power, however, the country soon 
became highly unstable (Oberon, 1996).  In 1957 Sukarno, the nation's first President, was 
forced to declare martial law to resolve mounting social and economic instability.  In 1959 a 
system of ‘guided democracy’ was introduced and in 1960 an Eight Year Plan adopted, to 
achieve self-sufficiency in necessities and ‘self-sustained growth’ (Hill, 1996). 
 
Sukarno's rule was to last until 1965.  It was characterised by strong nationalistic and 
interventionist policies, as well as state-led industrialisation (MacIntyre and Jayasuriya, 1995).  
The military, who had assisted Sukarno's rise to power, continued to play a significant role in 
the Indonesian economy through their special position (dwifungsi) in parliament and other non-
military areas of the economy.  This included the management of previously Dutch-owned 
companies (nationalised at independence) and the control of newly-formed public companies, 
financed by heavy overseas borrowing and revenue from Indonesia's rich oilfields.  These 
policies, however, proved disastrous.  Mismanagement and corruption were endemic, resulting 
in poor productivity and a decrease in export earnings.  The government compounded this 
situation by continuing to support poor performers and Indonesia slipped further into the 
economic doldrums.  Economic commentators of the time considered the country a “basket 
case” and its economic problems as serious as many of the least developed countries (Hill, 
1996: 1). 
 
In 1965 Sukarno’s “Old Order” was overthrown by the military, led by General Suharto.  The 
military continued their dual role in the management and the protection of the nation under the 
new president, as they do today.  The first priority of the ‘New Order’ government was to 
rescue the Indonesian economy from collapse. Inflation was running at an annual rate of over 
600 percent, the country had massive foreign debt, and unemployment was widespread (Sjahrir 
and Brown, 1995).  A series of five year development plans, known by the acronym 
REPELITA were put in place.  At first these rehabilitation plans, developed by a group of local 
and overseas advisers, were quite liberal.  They recommended more outward-looking and 
market-oriented policies.  This led to the removal of preferential treatment for state  
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organisations, a renegotiation of foreign debt, encouragement of the private sector, and 
liberalisation of trade (MacIntyre and Jayasuriya, 1995). 
 
The worst of Indonesia's economic problems were beginning to improve by the 1970's when a 
political backlash against foreign involvement in the economy, nationalistic riots, and a surge in 
revenue from an oil boom pressured Suharto to adopt a less liberal approach, especially at the 
micro-economic level.  While the private sector was not discouraged, the government set about 
state-based industrialisation again, tightening its foreign trade and investment policies 
(MacIntyre and Jayasuriya, 1995).  There were heavy investments in Pertamina (oil), Krakatau 
Steel, mining, cement, fertiliser, and paper plants, palm oil estates, banks and public utilities 
(Oberon, 1996).  The government continued these protectionist and expansionist policies until 
the negative world oil shocks of the 1980's. 
 
By this time public service expenditure in Indonesia had become a real financial burden (CIPE, 
1991) – caused by too many employees, corruption, inefficiencies, and cronyism (Halligan and 
Turner, 1995).  A downturn in oil prices, one of the country's major revenue earners, between 
1982 and 1986, magnified the situation.  This forced the government to take action.  In 1983 
deregulation and debureaucratisation of the public sector, and trade reforms were begun.  These 
brought immediate benefits encouraging exports, foreign investment, international aid and 
efficiencies in the public sector.  Not long after, another series of national plans were 
implemented (Repelita V, 1989-1994) which focused on administrative reform.  These changes 
included better management controls, job analysis, improved leadership, simplification of 
procedures, the design of management information systems, and a greater emphasis on local 
government autonomy (Oberon, 1996).  Jomo (1997) has noted that while the government's 
reformatory intentions were admirable, these were frequently undermined by the politically 
influential, thus compromising the good that could have been done. 
 
Debureaucratisation did help improve the speed of decision-making in state enterprises.  By 
1995 corruption had been reduced (CIPE, 1991; Halligan and Turner, 1995) and red tape 
processes significantly streamlined.  Haque (cited Jomo, 1997) also noted that the attitudes of 
bureaucrats toward private businesses had definitely improved.  According to Indonesian 
Central Bureau Statistics, however, state sector employment continued to expand (4,044,703 in 
1995)) and government involvement in the economy was still high, at 15 percent of GDP in 
1995, mainly because of their ownership of some 178 SOEs (Oberon, 1996).  Further  
  
 
10
privatisation and a zero growth plan were introduced about this time (Halligan and Turner, 
1995).  This included the appointment of a special team of officials with the responsibility of 
floating 166 state enterprises.  In 1994 PT Indosat (a satellite communications company) was 
privatised, followed by PT Tambang Timah in 1995 then a quarter of PT Telkom.  Bank Negara 
was privatised in 1996 and PT Jasa Marga (a toll road company) in 1997.  PT Aneka Tambang 
(mining) and Krakatau Steel were also prepared for sale.  Other organisations including PT 
Semen Gresik, a cement-maker and PT Indosat were listed on the stock exchange. The 
government took other measures, appointing a Ministry and Minister of State Administrative 
Reforms, and running anti-corruption seminars to deal with local corruption which was 
considered, by the Berlin-based company Transparency International, to be one of the worst 
examples in the world (Reyes, 1998). 
 
Not all of those organisations identified as suitable targets for privatisation were spun-off, 
however. This was due to their poor financial performance and for political reasons (Oberon, 
1996). There were also fears that Chinese Indonesians would purchase ex-state companies.  
Prior to 1997 Chinese Indonesians constituted just three percent of the population but held more 
than 70 percent of commercial capital (Vatikiotis, 1998).  Despite reform plans then, 
government changes were less than successful.   As the BPK (the Supreme Audit Agency) 
revealed, more than Rp210.41 billion was lost by state companies, ministries and banks in 
1997, and an extra Rp38.24 billion by local government (Jakarta Post, June 26, 1997, 1).  The 
government had developed reformist policies but these were ignored or failed to address the 
capability of management to carry them out. For example, budgets and reporting requirements 
were overlooked, there was still overstaffing, and there were a multiple of managerial 
objectives (Jomo, 1997).  Those in the government's old guard and powerful people close to the 
President additionally undermined reform attempts (CIPE, 1991: 2).  Toward the mid 1990's 
these issues were compounded by growing internal signs of dissatisfaction with the leadership, 
and calls for more reform and an end to corrupt practices by many internal groups.  
 
Notwithstanding the above comments, public sector reform and economic development in 
Indonesia have been praised by leading world economists (Hill, 1996).  According to a 1994 
U.S. Department of Commerce report, economic growth has been steady, the private sector  
has played a more important role in the economy, and it has become more diversified.  
Indonesia’s economic performance in the past 30 years has been characterised as “a remarkable 
transformation” (Hill, 1996: 3).  One of the government's most significant  
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achievements was the alleviation of poverty in Indonesia.  In 1970 some 70 percent of 
Indonesians were estimated to be living below the poverty line.  In 1990 this had dropped to 15 
percent (Vatikiotis, 1998). 
 
As the Indonesian economy diversified into manufacturing, however, the wealth created was 
distributed into fewer and fewer hands.  The lack of a strong legal structure in Indonesia 
allowed this to occur and, with no checks on the power of the President, family members and 
associates increasingly abused their positions (Vatikiotis, 1998).  Public indignation, however, 
also increased.  This was brought to a head in 1997 by the Asian financial crisis which began in 
Thailand and soon spread to nearby nations.  The credit crisis pushed up inflation, caused 
bankruptcies and unemployment, and made imports inaccessible to the average citizen.  The 
removal of price controls on staple goods and oil was the last straw for Indonesians.  Student 
protests increased around the country reaching a peak in May, 1998.  Professional, religious 
and academic groups joined protests calling for 'reformasi’ and leadership change.  These were 
not always peaceful, with more than 700 deaths and 3000 buildings damaged in riots in Jakarta, 
the capital, alone.  Riots and widespread damage were also felt in Medan and other major 
centres. 
 
On May 21, 1998, a day after the National Awakening Day that commemorates the birth of 
Indonesian nationalism, a beleaguered Suharto finally resigned.  This was a reluctant decision, 
forced by a disintegrating power base and after the military had informed Suharto they could no 
longer guarantee security (Vatikiotis, 1998).  Vice-President Habibie, a former confidante of 
the former president, was then appointed as a transitional president, despite strong opposition 
from many who thought this meant the old guard were still in control.  The economy is now the 
nation’s biggest problem, although the IMF has provided some short-term financial relief.  The 
future of Indonesia is now dependent on a peaceful lead-up to the 1999 elections and on how 
officials deal with their devastated economy.  The latter is "expected to contract 10% this year, 
unemployment is already estimated at 14 million, or 15% of the workforce, and inflation is 
running at 60% ", (McBeth, Vatikiotis, and Cohen, 1998, 16). 
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5.  Malaysia 
 
Malaysia gained independence from the British in 1957, nearly eight years after Indonesia.  The 
first Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, headed a coalition party representing indigenous 
Malays (Bumiputras), Indians and Chinese, and fostering essentially free-market policies as the 
British colonials had done.  They maintained this approach until the 1970s, although there was 
intervention to promote rural development and protect import-substitution industries, natural 
resource processing and manufacturing (World Bank, 1995: 134).  Of the three coalition 
groups, Bumiputras had a greater proportion of political power because of their numbers and 
geographic spread.  In 1969, however, race riots shook the country.  These were triggered by 
the dissatisfaction of indigenous groups about their economic position.  Following this unrest, 
the government introduced a New Economic Policy (NEP) to provide Bumiputras with more 
economic opportunities.  The aim was to increase their involvement in the economy to 30 
percent by 1990 (Campos and Esfahani, 1996).  As part of this policy public organisations were 
developed to "either compete directly with private enterprise or to hold share capital in trust for 
Bumiputras", (Lim, 1995: 111).  The economic success of the NEP has been questioned by 
some observers (see Rimmer, 1996: 33) but it is clear that the overriding objective of the 
government after the riots, was not so much economic development as national unity and 
stability (Jayasankaran, 1993:285) and the redistribution and balancing of wealth (Jomo, 1997). 
 
Malaysia's economy, which derived around 15 percent of its total export revenue from oil and 
related products, grew substantially in the 1970's, as did the government's investment in state 
enterprises.  When oil shocks hit the country some ten years later the government responded by 
launching a state-owned heavy industries sector, under the Heavy Industries Corporation of 
Malaysia (Somogyi, 1991).  The corporation invested in oil refineries, cement and automotive 
plants, sponge iron plants, a solid steel rolling mill, a methanol and ammonia-urea plant, a pulp 
and paper plant, and a petrochemical complex (Lim, 1995).  The economy continued to decline, 
however, and public enterprises failed to deliver.  The government then turned to the private 
sector for growth, offering tax incentives and encouraging them to develop the country's 
infrastructure (Somogyi, 1991).  At the same time it initiated public sector reforms. 
 
The worldwide recession of the 1980's, that followed the oil shocks, had forced the Malaysian 
government to address the poor performance of state organisations (Ministry of Finance,  
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Malaysia, 1992).  Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, the fourth Prime Minister, began this process by 
reducing the budgets of poorly performing state organisations, and by downsizing others 
(Campos and Esfahani, 1996).  Privatisation also began, starting with Malaysia Airline Systems 
(MAS) and Malaysia International Shipping Corporation Berhad (MISC).  Other state assets 
were leased out, managers were placed on contract, there were management buy-outs and 
corporatisation began.  The Prime Minister, however, made it clear that the country's new 
direction would involve close co-operation between private sector and government.  This 
partnership was named “Malaysia Inc”.  The government also took care to ensure that state 
employees would not be materially harmed by loss of work benefits or their jobs during these 
changes (Nankani, 1990).  This was policy rather than legally enshrined, however, sometimes 
problems occurred as new owners attempted to maximise profits by cutting staff.  From 1993 
the government also required all local companies with more than 50 employees to contribute to 
a Human Resource Development Fund (HRDF) to assist with workforce training (Jomo, 1997). 
 The OECD Development Centre praised these steps, finding that out of six developing 
countries only Indonesia and Malaysia had “....managed to adjust without any apparent adverse 
impact on the poor” (World Development, 1991: 1505).  All of these Malaysian strategies were 
part of a wider set of medium and long term plans designed to take the country into the new 
millennium.  They included Vision 2020, which was launched in 1991 with the objective of 
making the country a world-class economy by that date.  This and other government initiatives 
continue to be well promoted in national media and broadly understood by most Malaysians. 
 
Boom time in Malaysia came to an abrupt end in 1997, however, when the region was hit by a 
financial crisis.  Dr Mahathir immediately castigated overseas speculators and bankers, blaming 
them for the situation (Hiebert, 1998).  This refrain continued into 1998, with some analysts 
worrying that the good that had been done in the country could soon be undone.  (Average 
income had gone from about $300 to $5000 per person before the crisis).  A year after the first 
impacts of the crisis, the Prime Minister announced Malaysia was in the grips of a recession, 
with -1.8 percent growth recorded for the first quarter of the year (Spaeth, 1998).  Now that 
growth has all but disappeared, some of the cracks in government privatisation schemes are 
starting to emerge into full view.  For example there have been major government bailors of 
privatised companies, as well as complaints about the awarding of private contracts and the 
selling of Sows to the Prime Minister’s family (Jayasankaran, 1998).  However, unlike 
Indonesia, Thailand and Korea, Malaysia has not yet had to call on the IMF for help. 
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6.  New Zealand 
 
New Zealand has been a self-governing country since 1907.  Before this it was a British colony 
for 67 years.  Since independence, it has operated as a unicameral parliamentary democracy, 
with the Queen as head of State and elections every three years.  Prior to 1984 it had a strong 
state welfare system, with care for all of its citizens.  Labour and National, the two main 
parties, traditionally competed for power, with National gaining office more often.  In 1996, 
however, a new proportional representative voting system was introduced to the country, giving 
smaller political parties greater power. The first election under this new voting system brought 
in a coalition government, comprising National and a small centre right party, New Zealand 
First. 
 
The New Zealand (NZ) economy has always been dependent on agricultural and horticultural 
trade.  During the 1950s and 1960s produce went mainly to the United Kingdom, and NZ had 
full employment, with an average of 4 percent GDP growth per annum.  In fact, in the 50's NZ 
had the third highest standard of living in the world (Evert, 1996).  In the 1960s, however, the 
United Kingdom joined the EEC and increased their trade to the region, while at the same time 
decreasing New Zealand imports.  New Zealand export revenues dropped considerably, 
resulting in economic instability.  The government reacted by increasing overseas borrowing 
(Douglas, 1988) but problems continued to mount and revenues dropped further (NZ Treasury, 
1996).  Again the government borrowed, investing in a series of “Think Big” initiatives 
designed to make New Zealand more self-sufficient in fuel, as well as continuing to protect 
domestic industries through subsidies, import restrictions and tax breaks for exporters.  
 
In 1979 NZ was rocked by the second world oil price shock.  This situation was compounded 
by a continuing fall in export revenue, mainly for commodities which constituted a large 
proportion of New Zealand exports (NZ Treasury, 1996), and a public sector that, by 1984, was 
soaking up about 39 percent of GDP (Ball, 1992).  In that same year parliamentary elections 
were won by Labour.  They inherited a deteriorating economy, allegedly in a critical state, and 
immediately began comprehensive economic reform. These were led by the Minister of 
Finance, Roger Douglas, who by his own admission did not intend giving the public the 
opportunity to oppose reforms; “the Labour Party seldom gained office, and when they did, 
rarely held it for more than one term” (Douglas, 1993).  Thus, the government acted swiftly 
overhauling the public sector; as part of a broader economic programme of tighter monetary 
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and fiscal policies.  Trade was freed up and sectoral deregulation began.  The government 
passed the State-Owned Enterprises Act (1986), giving SOE Chief Executives complete 
autonomy (NZ Treasury, 1996) and the State Sector Act (1988) was introduced.  These 
included contractual agreements for many Chief Executives, senior managers and directors, as 
well as annual performance agreements with the government (Ball, 1992). Restructuring, 
privatisation, corporatisation and downsizing of the public sector were carried out in earnest.  
For example, the NZ Post Office was corporatised, and NZ Rail and Telecom privatised.  The 
reforms also reduced public sector employment, 27 percent of total employment in 1987, to 20 
percent in 1994 (OECD, 1996a).  As it turned out, the Labour Government won the next 
election, holding power for a total of six years, in which time further change was introduced. 
 
A change in the New Zealand government in 1990 did not deflect this process, despite the fact 
that the two major political parties had traditionally adopted different policies when in power.  
Instead "the quest for expenditure cuts was intensified" (Boston et. al., 1996: 6).  In 1991 the 
Employment Contracts Act was passed, aimed at deregulating the tightly controlled labour 
market.  There was very little opposition from the once powerful union movement and by this 
stage the public were reeling.  As an OECD report recently stated, NZ had gone through more 
reforms and liberalisation, and in a shorter period of time, than any other OECD member 
(Evert, 1996). 
 
Public sector reform in NZ has been judged by some as successful (Douglas, 1988; Boston et. 
al., 1996; Evert, 1996; Evans et al, 1996).  Most of the positive evaluations have been by 
economists or those evaluating the changes from a purely economic perspective. Reduced 
government involvement in the economy, it is argued, improved economic growth.  This 
assessment, however, is not universal.  Many local commentators have been highly critical of 
reforms in their areas. Kelsey (1995), in her seminal criticism, explored the social implications 
of reforms and found them severely lacking.  Dalziel (1997: 12) also delivered a stinging 
rebuttal to those with positive views of the reforms. "...there is no clear-cut improvement in 
New Zealand’s growth performance, overseas debt was higher in 1995 than 1984, and 
substantial income sacrifices between 1988 and 1993 doubled the number of households in 
poverty.  The NZ-USA per capita income ratio remains lower than in 1984.”  Furthermore, 
while government involvement in the economy has fallen since 1984, overall government 
expenditure as a percentage of total GDP fell very little until 1992.  This was partly the result of 
increased government unemployment payouts - a result of public sector layoffs and the  
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closure of uncompetitive private companies.  Today, the potential for further reform in the NZ 
public sector is unclear.  Boston et al (1996) has observed that the mood of the NZ people 
means further reforms are unlikely to be supported.  Early signs indicate, however, that despite 
pre-1996 election promises privatisation and deregulation of the economy will probably 
continue, albeit at a slower pace. 
 
 
7.  Parallels and Discrepancies 
 
State sector reforms were initiated in New Zealand, Indonesia and Malaysia to improve 
economic efficiency and to promote growth.  This was to be achieved by varying degrees of 
decreased government involvement by economic diversification and deregulating different 
sectors to make them more internationally competitive.  The most significant impetus for 
reform in all three countries was first delivered by the world oil shocks of the 1970s and 1980s 
and the ensuing deteriorating terms of trade.  Prior to the mid 1980s Indonesia, Malaysia and 
NZ all had large state sectors that were widely viewed as inefficient.  All governments were 
also reliant on revenue from overseas commodity trading, and had a relatively small private 
sector and manufacturing base.  When macro-environmental factors beyond their control 
caused falls in export revenues they were forced to react.  In New Zealand the pace of reforms 
was rapid, with a heavy social burden.  In Malaysia and Indonesia, however, reforms were 
encouraged but at a slower pace and without the large employee lay-offs experienced in NZ.  
When the financial crisis hit Asia in 1997, however, Indonesia was forced to intensify 
economic and political reforms because of IMF loan conditions and mounting internal 
pressures.  In Malaysia the scene is currently uncertain.  Most analysts, however, predict the 
government will be forced to take tougher measures. 
 
There are other differences in the processes and characteristics of state reforms in the three 
nations.  New Zealand's public sector reforms have primarily been facilitated through new 
legislation, such as the State Owned Enterprise Act (1986), as well as the removal of restrictive 
practices.  These measures have been enforced and have become part of the NZ workplace 
environment.  In Malaysia and Indonesia, especially the latter, however, policies and 
regulations have been put in place but they have frequently been undermined by the politically 
influential and weak legal structure, and, therefore, have had limited success.  These  
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problems have been compounded by weak management who have often lacked the necessary 
capabilities to do the job (Jomo, 1997). 
 
Election cycles and their characteristics have affected all three governments' reform decisions. 
NZ has a three yearly democratic election cycle, with a real possibility of a change of 
government at these times.  This situation, and the country's strong legal infrastructure, has 
meant successive NZ governments have been quick to push through changes.  In Malaysia and 
Indonesia, a preference for guided democracy has meant leaders have stayed in power for long 
periods, despite five-yearly elections.  They have, therefore, been able to pursue their own 
agendas with less concern that other political parties will interfere with their policies. 
 
Governance in these countries can be extended into the social domain.  In New Zealand, the 
government went ahead with radical reforms, acknowledging it would be a painful period for 
New Zealanders.  The unemployed, it was hoped would, once re-trained, be soaked up by 
economic growth after the reforms or would be provided with a basic living allowance while 
unemployed.  In fact, in June 1984 when these changes began, unemployment was 65,055.  In 
June 1992 it peaked at 215,539, falling to 162,581 in June 1997 (Statistics New Zealand, 1997). 
 Krishnan (1995), Easton (1996) and Stephens et al (1995) maintained that absolute poverty in 
New Zealand rose sharply from 1984 to 1993. Up until 1997 both Malaysia and Indonesia 
managed to undertake public sector reforms without the severe social dislocation and pain 
experienced in New Zealand.  Both countries have in fact been praised for their considerate 
approach (World Development, 1991).  The fallout from the Asian crisis is likely to change 
this, however, as already unemployment has risen significantly in Indonesia. 
 
Socio-cultural factors have also influenced reform practices.  For example, Malaysia and 
Indonesia have a small Chinese population which has significant private ownership.  In the past 
this has caused tension and has influenced the direction and pace of reforms, including 
government actions to support indigenous (bumiputera and pribumi) representation in 
government and commerce.  The New Zealand government has been addressing some of the 
concerns of its indigenous people (Maori) but this has been outside the mainstream public and 
private sectors, and has not been enshrined in reform related legislation.  The group-oriented 
cultures of Malaysia and Indonesia may have also influenced the reform process.  Deference 
and respect for authority, paternalism, and a value of group needs over that of the individual, 
have all possibly supported the strongly centralised governance strategies of both Asian  
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nations.  Some commentators believe that these characteristics have allowed both leaders to 
stay in power and continue their policies, despite growing criticism (Vatikiotis, 1998). 
 
In sum, all three governments undertook reform of their public sectors following the oil shocks 
of the 1980s.  The steps that were initially undertaken, however, did little to aid failing state 
assets.  Big state-funded projects fared little better.  Eventually, steps were taken to revive these 
flagging economies by refocussing and restructuring state organisations to help turn them 
around.  Whether the reforms were successful, however, depends on whether one adopts a 
social or economic perspective.  As Le Heron and Park (1995:179) suggested, 
 
 “The processes [of industrialisation] may or may not be primarily economic in 
character.  This conception has major consequences for the interpretation of 
industrialisation processes in the Asian Pacific Rim.  Instead of regarding a priori, 
that there is a single or unchanging or unmodifiable model of industrialisation, the 
form and nature of mid-late twentieth century industrialisation is seen as beginning 
in and constructed from the historical and geographic circumstances of different 
nation states.” 
 
This study has also suggested there are differences in the way reforms have been carried out 
and the philosophies behind these changes.  Easton (1994) has characterised economic reform 
in New Zealand  as 'the blitzkrieg approach', for it has an underlying belief in the ability of the 
market to deliver economic growth without government interference.  The two Asian countries, 
however, have to date followed a less radical path in their search for economic transformation 
(MacMurray, 1993).  Jomo (1997) has observed that countries like Indonesia and Malaysia, 
while recognising the need for more open economies, have pursued initiatives more in line with 
a philosophy of imperfect competition.  Guided liberalisation and internationalisation policies 
were, therefore, followed to foster local industrialisation, as well as to avoid the excessive 
competition of open-market economies. 
 
 
8.  Managerial Implications 
 
Thus far, we have focused predominantly on the economic aspects of restructuring.  Now we 
turn briefly to the practical implications of state sector reforms for Organisational management. 
 Many economic analysts and commentators have been quick to call for the reduced role of the 
state, the need for anti-corruption measures and the need to overhaul many  
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state projects, especially recently in Asia, including Malaysia and Indonesia.  What does this 
mean, however, for senior managers in government organisations who have been given the task 
of overseeing these changes? 
 
Managers of commercial organisations develop different skills and experiences to their 
counterparts in government.  The primary requirement for public sector managers to be a “good 
employer” and to be able to provide “the best possible service” is very different to the 
requirements placed on private sector managers.  The latter must achieve these things within a 
certain budget, be accountable for outcomes and profit, as well as have employee remuneration 
tied to performance.  In New Zealand there has been a dual strategy to meet this problem.  First, 
when public organisations were corporatised then privatised, senior levels of management were 
replaced by managers from the commercial sector.  Secondly, middle and front-line managers 
received intensive training in various aspects of commercial management, such as strategic 
planning and marketing.  This was achieved via customised simulated strategy games and block 
courses.  In most instances,  middle and lower level public organisation managers were also 
prepared for the major changes required in a commercial environment through the intermediate 
process of corporatisation that led to privatisation.  In New Zealand the transition appears to 
have been effected relatively smoothly, although not without difficulty.  Most public sector 
managers in organisations such as Telecom and the Post Office were technically focused.  Their 
mission was to ensure technical excellence in their organisations; however, as private sector 
managers their focus has now had to widen to include commercial criteria and exigencies - 
technical excellence constrained and balanced by the need to meet new commercial bottom 
lines.  It is a tribute to their quality as managers and to the training they received that most have 
been able to adapt their technical skills to this new environment, under the guidance of a senior 
manager brought in from the commercial sector. 
 
Overall, there is little information about management capabilities in Indonesia and Malaysia.  
In general, both appear to have underestimated the extent to which employees would require 
specific skills and training to carry out reforms (Jomo, 1997).  Historically as well, policies to 
redistribute wealth and the characteristics of colonial governments have all contributed to the 
weakness of government management.  For example, from the 1970’s the Malaysian 
government developed positive discrimination policies to rebalance the social and economic 
benefits of growth, to increase Bumiputra representation in government and commerce.  This 
has sometimes meant the most able applicants have not been appointed to key positions.  
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 Malaysia was also left with a British Civil Service legacy which discouraged specialisation 
and, as a result, did not provide employees with an opportunity to consolidate and develop 
competencies in any one area (Jomo, 1997).  In Indonesia, government attempts to reform the 
public sector have been ignored by many managers.  For example, budgets and reporting 
requirements have not been complied with (Bhattacharya and Pangestu, in Jomo, 1997).  The 
government also raised salaries across the board by between 34% to 73% in an effort to 
motivate their staff but this was an 'across the board' step and not aligned with performance 
(Jakarta Post, July 8, 1997).  Any positive effects of this move, furthermore, were mitigated by 
the weakness of the Indonesian legal system and the politically powerful positions of some 
officials (Jomo, 1997). 
 
Exactly what constitutes an effective state sector is situation specific, dependent on the 
backgrounds and needs of each country.  The most basic ingredients of successful economic 
reform, however, are a sound legal infrastructure, effective macro-economic policies, 
environmental protection, and investment in social frameworks.  In terms of government 
organisations and their management, there also needs to be a way to ensure employee actions 
follow new directives (World Development Bank Report, 1997).  Transparency, accountability, 
honesty and professionalism should all be encouraged by performance incentives.  At this 
stage, however, what is needed in countries hit by the recent financial crisis is a fuller 
understanding of the gap between current government employee management capabilities and 
those that are needed in the future.  This especially applies to countries like Indonesia and 
Malaysia.  What seems clear, furthermore, is that although there are some broad generic reform 
principles which may be applied in any country, there is no fixed recipe or formula for success. 
 Each nation’s restructuring process has to accommodate local custom,  culture and history, 
something organisations like the IMF are now only gradually awakening to. 
 
Finally, the research reported in this paper was an exploratory and descriptive study.  Every 
possible step was taken to collect relevant data so that a comparison of Indonesia, Malaysia and 
New Zealand reforms could be made.  There was difficulty, however, in accessing detailed 
restructuring data pertaining to the latter two countries - information that would have helped 
give greater depth to this study.  As Haley and Tan (1996) have noted though, information is 
often difficult to access in South-East Asia.  This limitation should be taken into consideration  
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when making inferences from this study. The researchers would welcome any contact with 
academics in Indonesia and Malaysia in this regard. 
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